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How Might Psychology Contribute to Reducing the Risk of Nuclear War? James G. Blight' Dear Professor Freud, . ..This is the problem: Is there any way of delivering mankind from the menace of war? ...I personally see a simple way of dealing with the superficial aspect of the problem: the setting up, by international consent, of a legislative and judicial body to settle every conflict... (Einstein, July 1932) Dear Professor Einstein, ...You have taken me by surprise...by posing the question of what can be done to protect mankind from the curse of war...with what seemed to be a practical problem, a concern for statesmen...The ideal condition of things would of course be a community of men who had subordinated their instinctual life to the dictatorship of reason. But in all probability that is a utopian expectation. No doubt the other indirect methods of preventing war are more practicable, though they promise no rapid success... (Freud, Sept. 1932) The only thing which psychology has a right to postulate at the outset is the fact of thinking itself...thought goes on. (William James, 1890) Several recent attempts are surveyed in which psychologists have tried to apply their professional insights to the problem of reducing the risk of nuclear war. These include those directed at deep causes (the U.S.-Soviet relationship), intermediate causes (imperfect rationality of decision-makers) and, briefly, precipitating causes (effects of stress). In each case, little or no influence on the nuclear policy-making process can be discerned; U.S. foreign policymakers charged with managing the risk of nuclear war operate virtually independently of psychology. In order to bring nuclear policy-making and psychological insights together, a phenomenological approach to nuclear crisis ' Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138. 617 0162-895X/86/1200-0617$05.00/1 @ 1986 International Society of Political Psychology management is described, the central task of which is a systematic description of the evolution during crises of beliefs held by decision-makers about risk of nuclear war.
INTRODUCTION
Ever since psychology was organized into a separate discipline, intellectuals concerned with reducing the risk of war have looked to its methods and findings for insights which might be applied to international politics. Shortly after the Spanish-American War, for example, William James (1977b) wrote an essay espousing what he called "The Moral Equivalent of War." James, a Darwinian, argued that institutions must be created which help to channel our aggressive instincts into useful, rather than destructive directions.
Later, during the rise of fascism and the drift toward World War in the 1930s, physicist Albert Einstein became convinced that psychological variables-our "manner of thinking," as he called it-lay at the very core of the causation of war among nations. Einstein believed that if only a way could be found to "think" in global, rather than nationalistic terms, war could be avoided, perhaps permanently. In an exchange published as "Why War" (Einstein and Freud, 1966) , he wrote to Freud, the most eminent psychologist of his time, for assistance in provoking a psychological revolution which would usher in global thinking. Freud (Einstein and Freud, 1966) responded politely but firmly that he could provide no such assistance; he knew of no way psychology could make any direct contribution to reducing the risk of war.
In the past several years, there has been an emphatic revival of interest among psychologists and others in applying psychological insights to the problem of reducing the risk of war, especially nuclear war. In the following sections, I have surveyed some of the most influential recent attempts to link psychological knowledge with reducing the risk of nuclear war. My conclusion regarding this enterprise is not unlike Freud's in response to Einstein's inquiry: The results so far indicate that the revival of Einsteinian enthusiasm is unwarranted. In sum, the critical conclusions are these:
1. There has been little or no influence on the policy-making process, at the level of deep, intermediate, or precipitating psychological causes of a potential nuclear war.
2. There is reason to believe that such influence will continue to be minimal and also, in fact, that it probably should be minimal, when viewed from the policy-maker's perspective.
The most compelling reason policy-makers have for ignoring psychiatrists and psychologists is this: the assumptions and modus operandi at each level are utopian -in the case of the "depth" psychologists (see section 2) because they believe they can change the mental structures of virtually all important world leaders, and for the "intermediate" behavioral scientists (see section 3) because they believe they can convince foreign policy makers that it is in their best interest to permit the transformation of nuclear policy into a virtual applied behavioral science. I believe that each of these pursuits has been and will remain fruitless. Thus, since I regard influence on the policy process as the sine qua non of successful nuclear risk reduction, I believe psychologists are likely to remain out in the cold, as it were, without influence, despite all their good intentions.
As I argue in the last two sections, on precipitating psychological causes of a potential nuclear war, the time may be right for viewing the potential linkage between risk of nuclear war and psychology in a new light. The main requirement is that psychologists learn to think in a non-utopian way about the problem of nuclear risk reduction and that they therefore avoid calling for conversion-like psychological revolutions and suggesting "off the shelf" solutions from their laboratories and clinics. In the final section, an outline is sketched of a phenomenological approach to the precipitating psychological causes, an approach which may eventually yield psychological information more useful to policy-makers than have previous approaches (Blight, 1985a,b; .
PSYCHOLOGIES OF AVOIDING NUCLEAR WAR: AN ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK
In searching for a useful framework within which to discuss various psychological approaches to avoiding nuclear war, I suggest we start with this dilemma: On the one hand, we believe that under anything like present conditions, it would be impossible for the leadership of a superpower to calculate rationally the expected benefits and costs to be derived from initiating a nuclear war, and conclude that such a step would be worth it. On the other hand, we do not believe a nuclear war is impossible. As is often said, although nuclear war would be "insane," thus improbable, its putative "insanity" does not preclude its occurrence, for apparently "insane" actions occur all the time (Allison et al., 1985) .
While we need not object to this commonplace linkage of nuclear war with "insanity," we need to be clear about the sort of breakdown or degradation of rationality that is most to be feared. It is emphatically not clinical psychosis or "craziness" in the colloquial sense: that is, a breakdown (in the psyche of a leader, say) in the ability to make relatively rational, expected value calculations. For although such a breakdown may conceivably occur in the stress of a crisis, there is little evidence that wars are mainly caused by the dissociation in the mental states of leaders who have gone mad. In any case, one hardly knows how to plan for the intrusion of clinical insanity into international politics.
Rather, an "insane" major nuclear war is far more likely to result from one or another leadership calculating, in as rational a fashion as decisionmaking bodies are capable, that initiating a nuclear war is in fact "worth it," on balance. How, generally speaking, might this occur? It would begin with one side coming to believe, probably by a misreading of intentions, that the other side was no longer rational, that in fact the adversary seemed willing and able to go all the way to nuclear war in order to resolve a crisis to its advantage.
If this occurred, and if each side then began to doubt the other's intention to avoid a nuclear war, then a spiral of threats and counter-threats backed by military moves might ensue, a spiral which might lead one or both sides to believe that their situation was so perverse that the single action which promised the best hope of maximizing gains and cutting losses would be escalation to the nuclear level, or even massive preemption.
Thus the often-mentioned "insanity" of a nuclear war would assert itself, in large part for psychological reasons, but not because leaders would have lost their minds, like General Ripper in Stanley Kubrick's film, "Dr. Strangelove" (1962) . Rather, the insanity in question would more aptly describe a situation, arrived at by misperception and rational calculation, so perverse as to render as the "best" option the initiation of a disastrous nuclear war.
Thus any psychological approach to avoiding nuclear war which seeks to reduce the risks, must in some way address these questions:
1. How might an act which, under normal, relatively relaxed conditions, is regarded by all concerned as "insane" (and thus unlikely to occur), be transformed into an act viewed by relevant participants as progressively less insane, relatively less maladaptive than the logic of deterrence suggests it should be? How can we describe the process by which the intentions of deterrence may become inverted?
2. What ought to be done to halt or reverse this process? The great (and apparently growing) fear is that nuclear weapons, ostensibly designed and deployed only to prevent all use of nuclear weapons, will be used anyway. Thus we must do our best to enter into some imagined psychological process that may lead to an increased proclivity to initiate nuclear war, to map its general contours and then to suggest policies and other interventions that promise to prevent our imagined nightmares from actually happening.
This means that we should adopt what I prefer to call a "functional" approach to avoiding nuclear war. Most people who have been paid throughout the nuclear age to think about avoiding nuclear war have adopted, conversely, a "structural" approach, according to which one tries to structure forces and strategies in such a way that rational actors on all sides, noticing from their calculations just how foolish a nuclear war would be, decide not to initiate one. In fact, this is generally what is meant by "deterrence."
A functional approach takes all this pretty much for granted: Rationally, nuclear war is not at present, or for the foreseeable future, "worth it." At this point, the nuclear functionalist begins to worry, especially about factors that might influence calculations of the perceived "worth" of initiating nuclear war. Malfunctions, or potential malfunctions, represent that aspect of the "insanity" of nuclear war into which functionalists must propel their imaginations. These possibilities, moreover, depend for their possibility largely, perhaps even mainly, on variables we all tend to think of as psychological. For simplicity's sake, we may identify at least three canonical sources of possible malfunction in the process of trying to maintain mutual nuclear deterrence:
1. Human beings interact with mechanical systems. 2. Human beings also interact with each other. 3. Human beings also interact, as a vast and abstract "system" of foreign policy, with another such variegated "system" representing the nuclear adversary. To the nuclear functionalist, particularly to one trained in the behavioral sciences, this Ptolemaic-like system of machinery, perceptions, decisions, beliefs, and so on, is veritably filled to overflowing with possibilities for systemic and systematic, and potentially tragic, error. It is important to notice that this is so even if, as appears presently to be the case, the nuclear forces of the superpowers are mutually redundant and the second strike capacity of each is regarded as unquestionably invulnerable.
A glance at Table I (Nye, 1984) will reveal why a functionalist approach lends itself so interestingly to fertilization from the behavioral sciences. Risk of surprise attack, a "bolt from the blue," is generally regarded as least probable. Why? Because forces are structured to prevent it and, short of total madness overtaking one or another leadership of either superpower, the structures themselves prevent the calculations required to believe an all-out firststrike "out of the blue" is worth the risk. Prevention of this sort of path being taken is what most of our nuclear forces are in fact designed for, and they thus far have done their job well.
But notice the central characteristic of the two paths to nuclear war usually regarded as most dangerous: (1) escalation of conventional war and (2) preemption in crisis. Each occurs in the midst of a deep superpower crisis-that is, leaders of the superpowers, observing the unfolding of a shooting war or a deep political conflict, begin to perceive that the threat is great enough, the risk is high enough, and time may be short enough, that a nuclear war could result (Lebow, 1981) . Although more will be said later about the concept of crisis, we may simply notice here that, viewed psychologically, it is what psychologists would probably refer to as a mental state, within which the occurrence of a specific event, the failure of deterrence, is to be prevented. The fundamental point of the nuclear functionalist is just that, while in a state of crisis, the act which everyone concerned formerly regarded as insane, may no longer appear insane at all. In a sense, the functionalist program for avoiding nuclear war, under present and foreseeable force levels and structures, boils down to this: Avoid crises between the superpowers and where this proves to be impossible, learn to manage them successfully. This becomes all the more obvious in Table II , in which are represented summaries of strategies for avoiding nuclear war (Nye, 1984; p. 407 ; see also Allison et al., 1985, pp. 12-13) . Notice in the left-hand column that, no matter where we choose to enter some imagined path to nuclear war -whether at the level of (1) precipitating, (2) intermediate or (3) deep causes -our goal is to avoid nuclear war via avoiding crises (or, in the case of an actual, precipitating crisis, via managing it successfully).
In addition to emphasizing paths through malfunctioning in crises by which one might arrive at nuclear war, and also its accommodation of three basic levels at which one might try to understand and attack the problem, a nuclear functionalist must also accord great importance to a third factor, one which is an almost purely psychological construct. It is the idea that, in constructing and executing foreign policy, including nuclear policy, one is liable to make certain sorts of errors, mainly errors in perception, which lead to erroneous beliefs, which in turn may lead to mistaken policies and actions. This basic insight is derived from a point popularized recently by Robert Jervis (1976 Jervis ( , 1983 , called the "security dilemma": that in a world of quasi-anarchic relations such as those which characterize the interactions of nation-states, increasing one's own security may tend to decrease that of others, and vice versa.
This implies that not only may we speak legitimately of failures of deterrence, but also of failures of what I prefer to call, adapting a suggestion of Jonathan Dean (1983) and Michael MccGwire (1984) , failures of reassurance. One may, that is, fail to reassure an adversary that various forces and weapons are intended for defense, thus the intention is misread, and the adversary responds in kind in order to protect his own security. As Jervis has observed and as a nuclear functionalist must take fully into account, a kind of "spiraling" may occur which produces crises like that which seems to have We may call the former sort of error of provocation or intimidation a hawk's error, while we should refer to the sort of invitation to aggression brought on by inadequate deterrence as a dove's error (Allison et al., 1985, pp. 212-214) . The overall foreign policy goal thus becomes "balanced deterrence"-the attempt to avoid excessive provocation and excessive invitation. We may fill out our foreign policy aviary with an "owl's error -a "frozen safety catch," which is something like excessive organizational and mechanical safeguards against responding with force when it really is appropriate to do so. From a psychological standpoint, however, a dove's error and an owl's error would produce the same result: if an adversary believed either that a leadership lacked the will or the ability to respond quickly and effectively to aggression, then this error (dove's or owl's) would constitute an invitation to aggression, leading perhaps to a failure of deterrence, and war.
Two important characteristics of a Hawk's Error and a Dove's Error should be noticed. First, each represents an instance of inadvertent psychological misreading, or misperception. One believes that it takes either too much or too little to deter an adversary and this sort of mistake must be due in large part to the inability to view one's own security arrangements as an adversary might view them. Second, these sorts of psychologically based errors can manifest themselves at any of the three levels of causation along which one might imagine following a path clear through to nuclear war. Each of these characteristics is illustrated in Table III. In the sections which follow, this framework is applied to recent work on deep and intermediate causes of a potential nuclear war and to prospective work on precipitating causes. In the title of a recent article, Robert R. Holt (1984) , the distinguished psychologist and psychoanalytic theorist, has put into a single short question the entire program of the depth psychologists and psychiatrists of our nuclear dilemma: He asks: "Can Psychology Meet Einstein's Challenge?" The paper begins with a reminder of the challenge, as laid down by Einstein shortly after World War II: "The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking, and thus we drift toward unparalleled catastrophe. . . . a new type of thinking is essential if mankind is to survive" (cited in Holt, 1984, pp. 199-200) . Even a casual perusal of the books in the "Nuclear" sections that have sprung up lately in many bookstores will reveal the astounding influence of Einstein, a physicist, on the present generation of psychologists and psychiatrists who have become professionally concerned with nuclear policy.
These, then, are the two fundamental constituents of what I will call nuclear depth psychology; both are derivable (and in many cases are actually derived) from the political writings of Einstein. First, the risk of nuclear war is held to be rising constantly and rapidly due to the existence of an arms race between the superpowers. This race is run by both superpowers ostensibly to bolster deterrence and thus to avoid a nuclear war. But nuclear depth psychologists believe that the arms race will eventually have precisely the opposite result: They hold that the leadership of one country (or both) will because of fear, miscalculation, or technological error, initiate the nuclear war presently feared by all.
But nuclear depth psychology is distinguished principally by the emphasis its advocates place upon deep psychological processes, the pathology of which is believed to explain an arms race they regard as patently irrational -in the sense that the end toward which they believe it is taking us, nuclear war, is the very inverse of the goal sought by advocates of a vigorous nuclear weapons competition between the superpowers. In short, nuclear depth psychologists believe that what they take to be our present and escalating nuclear danger can be traced to problems in our collective thinking about nuclear war and nuclear deterrence and that these problems are deep and usually outside the awareness of those who make and execute nuclear policy. They thus conceptualize risk of nuclear war as mainly a psychological problem: If we could alter the way we think in fundamental ways, chiefly by shifting to a less parochial, more global perspective, the deep psychopathology would be cured, the arms race would be terminated, and the risk of nuclear war could be greatly reduced, perhaps ultimately even to zero. Two schools of thought dominate nuclear depth psychology. I will characterize them within the terminology suggested by Holt (1984, pp. 211-212) . On the one hand, there are the cognitivists, those who believe that the deep psychopathology driving the arms race is a pathology of personal cognition, albeit one involving the cognitions of a great many leaders in the United States and the Soviet Union. To put the point somewhat colloquially, but pointedly: Cognitivists believe the arms race is crazy because crazy people are running it. As we shall see presently, this approach to the problem of nuclear risk has led many people straightaway to the view that the cure for superpower psychopathology is not fundamentally different in kind from the psychotherapeutic process required to cure any sort of psychological illness involving thought disorder. For most cognitivists, not only may the problem of nuclear risk be conceptualized psychologically, but so also may the cure, which is some process akin to psychotherapy.
The other principal school of nuclear depth psychology is that of the interactionists. Advocates of this view tend to believe that there is no evidence suggesting the presence of widespread pathology in the cognitions of the individual leaders of either superpower. Rather, they argue that the deep psychopathology is more abstract, embodied in what they take to be a pathological relationship between the two countries. Within what nuclear depth psychologists take to be crazy patterns of interaction between the superpowers, especially institutionalized mistrust and assumptions of ubiquitous hostile intent, the leaders are seen as functioning quite rationally, as a rule, and one of the forms taken by their rational adaptation to a crazy system is participation in the nuclear arms race. Thus, according to the interactionists, if risk of nuclear war is to be reduced significantly, the quality of the superpower relationship must be changed fundamentally, and this implies a mainly political, rather than psychotherapeutic, cure for superpower psychopathology.
The most famous cognitivist among nuclear depth psychologists is Helen Caldicott. Categorical and self-righteous in her assertions, shrill in her writing and speaking, Caldicott might easily be ignored by serious students of nuclear psychology if it weren't for her astonishing popularity. She is a best-selling author, a speaker who is much in demand, a founding member of the reestablished Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR) and, more recently, a driving force behind Women's Action for Nuclear Disarmament (WAND). Thus one must assume that a great many people have, in Caldicott, found a voice commensurate in content and tone with their own deep fears and beliefs about risk of nuclear war (but see Coles, 1984 ).
Caldicott's writing is filled with ad hominem psychological asaults like the following:
The definition of a paranoid patient is someone who imagines a certain scenario in his or her own mind, decides (with no objective evidence) that this is exactly what someone else is thinking, and then decides to act on that notion. The paranoid delusions projected onto the Russian leaders come straight from the minds of American strategists and leaders, and these ideas probably reflect exactly what the Americans are planning to do themselves and bear little relationship to Soviet strategy or reality. (1984, pp. 174-175) .
Leading candidates for this diagnosis of paranoia are, according to Caldicott, "so-called broad-minded intellectuals who sat on Reagan's MX Commission" (The Scowcroft Commission). Moreover, she asserts, "such fantasy thinking is still practiced at the highest levels of government, including President Reagan and Defense Secretary Weinberger, and is overt paranoia" (1984, p. 174) . One may find similar diagnoses in Kovel ("paranoid madness"; 1983, p. 84) and Menninger ("exhibitionistic drunken gesturing of two suicidal giants"; 1983, p. 350).
Unfortunately for Caldicott and her cognitivist colleagues, however, her diagnoses are simply, demonstrably wrong. The Soviets have a vast nuclear arsenal; their missiles and bombers really are aimed at us; they really do have rather precise plans for using them to destroy us in a nuclear war (see, e.g., Holloway, 1985; Meyer, 1985) . However this state of affairs may have come about, our leaders do not simply imagine the Soviet nuclear threat. It is real, as anyone who examines the evidence may see.
In moving from her analysis of the problem of nuclear risk -crazy leaders -to her therapeutic prescriptions for a cure, Caldicott's irrelevance to the world of nuclear policy-making becomes total. Because she believes that deeply sick people are driving the risk of nuclear war upward, she must choose between two broad prescriptive alternatives: something akin to political revolution, by which our leaders, at any rate, would be forcibly replaced; or therapy, by which they would be healed. Kovel (1983) leans toward the former alternative; Caldicott, however, favors some novel forms of therapy, such as a kind of marriage counseling, in which each superpower would be required to "pledge" its "troth" to the other (1984, p. 292) , monthly wrestling matches between "the men who control the superpowers...to alleviate the built-up aggressions" (p. 305), and parental advice to "grow up and become responsible nations" (p. 337). One may at first wonder whether Caldicott puts forward such suggestions as these seriously but, noting the unrelentingly humorless tone of her writing, one suspects that she does. But because her cognitivist diagnoses are patently false, and because the realization of her prescription is so wildly improbable, the likelihood that the course she advocates will actually lead to a reduction in the risk of nuclear war ought to be rated at very nearly zero.
The interactionists among nuclear depth psychologists hold a much more sophisticated view of the relevance of psychology to alterations they believe may substantially reduce the risk of nuclear war. To interactionists, psychological insights are relevant to nuclear risk reduction mainly in indirect, suggestive ways which depend on the validity of an analogy: between "systems" of interaction between people which may be characterized as "certifiably pathological" (Holt, 1984, p. 211) , and the defective relationship between the superpowers, which is exhibited in an arms race which, in turn, is believed to drive risk of nuclear war continuously upward. In other words, whereas cognitivists like Caldicott diagnose the arms race psychologically in order to prescribe psychologically, interactionists diagnose psychologically in order to prescribe politically. Interactionists thus seek policies, not therapies, with which to heal what they view as a deeply pathological superpower relationship.
The roster of interactionists contains many of the most eminent American psychiatrists and psychologists, including Morton Deutsch (1983), Erik Erikson (1984) , Robert Holt (1984) , Robert Jay Lifton (Lifton and Falk, 1982) , John Mack (1985a,b) , Carl Rogers (1982) , and Ralph K. White (1984) . Here are characteristic statements from psychiatrist John Mack and psychologist Morton Deutsch on what they regard as the deep psychological problem underlying risk of nuclear war:
...the nuclear weapons competition actually is insane, or, to use the more modern term, psychotic, in some deep, formal or literal sense...In the case of the nuclear arms race, it is not individuals who are psychotic. Rather, the madness resides in collective patterns of thinking and relationships that are poorly adapted to the requirements of planetary survival in the nuclear age [Mack, 1985b, p. 53; see also, 1985a] ....the United States and the Soviet Union are trapped in a malignant social process giving rise to a web of interactions and defensive maneuvers, which, instead of improving their situations, make them both feel less secure, more vulnerable, and burdened and a threat to one another and to the world at large. (Deutsch, 1983, p. 21) Interactionists believe they have encountered similarly crazy processes before, in work with families and larger communities, and that is why they feel competent to speak out on what they regard as the psychopathology underlying the arms race.
The sort of prescriptions offered by interactionists seem, at first glance, much less reductionistic than those of the cognitivists. Interactionists implicitly try to act on a principle laid down by Stanley Hoffmann in his recent presidential address to the International Society of Political Psychology. According to Hoffmann, "even if one accepts the metaphors of collective disease or pathology, one must understand that the 'cure' can only be provided by politics" (Hoffmann, 1986) . Thus Mack looks forward to "a process of political maturation" (1985b, p. 53), while Deutsch favors measures by which "mutual security" will replace our present, nearly total dependence upon "national security" (1983, p. 24) . Each seeks to articulate political means to transform interactive superpower pathology, end the arms race and eliminate the risk of catastrophic nuclear war. In this way, via the political transformation of the superpower relationship, the interactionists among nuclear depth psychologists seek to alter our manner of thinking in line with Einstein's requirements.
While one must acknowledge the primafacie plausibility of the interactionist viewpoint, it is still impossible to be optimistic about the probability that interactionists' goals can actually by accomplished. For as Hoffmann (1986) has pointed out, all nuclear depth psychologists are radicals. All believe that risk of nuclear war is primarily a function of a superpower arms race driven by deep, recalcitrant psychopathology. The functional significance of this fact is that any important reduction in the risk of nuclear war is contingent upon accomplishing a fundamental alteration in the way the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union relate to each other, and while such an imagined transformation need not necessarily happen immediately, or even quickly, any rational evaluation of the prospects for nuclear depth psychology depends decisively upon one's estimate of the probability of discovering a plausible process of goal-directed, radical psychological change on an international scale. For interactionists, this requires a political process which can plausibly be predicted to yield a psychological change commensurate with interactionist requirements. Viewed schematically, there are two possible sources of political movement toward radical psychological transformation sought by the interactionists. Movement might occur from the bottom-up, in which radical populist episodes in recent Western history would be emulated in the new nuclear context. The views of ordinary people, sensing the need for a new way of thinking about nuclear war and superpower relations, would, in this imagined instance, gradually but completely infiltrate Western political and military establishments. When this occurs, Western political leaders would ask their Soviet counterparts to join them in halting the arms race. The Soviets, relieved, would reciprocate.
Alternatively, one can imagine interactionist goals being accomplished from the top-down. In this scenario, a leader of a superpower seizes a moment ripe for drastic change in superpower relations and takes measures which are unprecedentedly bold, perhaps including unilateral cuts in the nuclear arsenal, or a freeze on the deployment of weapons deemed by the adversary to be particularly useful for a first-strike. The leader's counterpart then reciprocates. Of course, one can imagine the bottom-up and top-down approaches combining in many ways and in different proportions. Yet these must be the broad constituents of any process of change equal to the requirements of the interactionists.
The key issue, however, is whether we should reasonably expect such processes actually to lead to the desired results: the end of the arms race and massive reduction in the risk of nuclear war. The answer is that we should not, and in arriving at this answer we may notice that the first-blush plausibility of the interactionists' program begins to collapse.
First, on the prospects for movement from the bottom-up: There is absolutely no evidence that grass-roots movements in the nuclear age have had the slightest impact on the direction and intensity of the nuclear arms competition (Betts, 1984) . Quite the contrary, in fact. In recent years, for exam-pie, the Freeze Movement, begun with high hopes and much fanfare in the early 1980s, appears already to be passing into a rapid demise without anything resembling even a partial freeze anywhere in sight (Klare, 1985) . It is simply a fact that, as Yorick Blumenfeld, a writer very sympathetic to radical nuclear politics, wrote recently, "The peace movement has had no visible impact on the scale or speed of the arms race" (1985, p. 44) . This has been true of all such movements in the nuclear age and, unless interactionists can find a way plausibly to argue that the future of bottom-up transformation will be the inverse of the past, there is no reason for optimism.
The same holds true for the top-down approach. There is simply no precedent for what the interactionists must try to envision and no reason to suppose a new precedent will be set. Morton Deutsch, for example, argues that the superpower psychopathology could eventually be eliminated if only "a bold and courageous American leadership would take a risk for peace... [and] announce its determination to end the crazy arms race" (1983, p. 23) . But consider the limiting case so far of top-down initiatives: President Kennedy's announcement on June 10, 1963 , that the United States would thereafter forego atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons so long as the other nuclear powers (the Soviet Union and Great Britain) did likewise. Psychologist Carl Rogers has argued that this bold move, combined with the Limited Test Ban Treaty which followed, is the prototype of the sort of process needed to begin to cure the pathological superpower relationship (Rogers, 1982, pp. 12-13 ).
Yet nothing remotely resembling any such radical transformation actually occurred. In fact, the event which probably contributed most to creating a need for a "thaw" in the cold war -the terrifying Cuban missile crisis of October, 1962-was also, paradoxically, a significant point of origin for the nuclear arms competition now so greatly feared by nuclear depth psychologists. For while one Soviet reaction to that near miss was a certain amount of increased receptivity to President Kennedy's proposal for an atmospheric test ban, yet another was probably the initiation (or at least the acceleration) of a massive Soviet nuclear arms buildup that, a generation later, continues unabated (Trachtenberg, 1985) . Thus, viewed in their full context, the events of 1963 were, in relation to the goals of the interactionists, utterly equivocal and cannot plausibly be regarded collectively as a potential point of departure for ending the arms race. They may in fact have contributed more to the cause of it than to some imagined cure.
Limitations of space do not permit an analysis of why the superpower relationship has proven so resistant to change and why it probably will continue to frustrate anyone seeking to transform it in fundamental ways. But some things are obvious: The two societies in question have drastically conflicting values; their political systems and the constraints governing their respective decision-making processes are so different as to be rendered almost mutually incomprehensible; there is even evidence which suggests that two huge and powerful hegemonic powers like the United States and the Soviet Union are bound to be very competitive (McNeill, 1982) . These must all be included in any plausible explanation of the longstanding and continuous enmity between the superpowers. The point for the nuclear depth psychologists is that, contra Einstein, none of this has changed or is likely to change -in short, everything has not changed except our thinking. In fact, the two most significant determinants of our thinking -our social structure (in the present case, the anarchical nation-state system) and our biological drives -have hardly changed at all. Einstein's basic premise is simply wrong and that is why the program of nuclear depth psychology, which is wholly consistent with this premise, is implausible.
The question arises, finally, as to whether an approach to reducing the deep psychological causes of the risk of nuclear war is conceivable whose prospects are brighter than those of nuclear depth psychology. In my view, the most responsibly optimistic answer is that it remains an open question. Yet those political psychologists seeking to operate at the level of deep causes of nuclear risk will need to face squarely an immense problem that has not been adequately dealt with, or scarcely even acknowledged, by nuclear depth psychologists. It is this: The deeper into the causal chain of international relations one wishes to look for means of reducing the risk of nuclear war, the further into the future one must look in anticipation of positive results. And the further into the future we look, the fuzzier our vision becomes, because the present state of our knowledge becomes less relevant to future worlds, because those worlds become progressively harder to imagine correctly. Not that one should necessarily avoid trying to look both deeply and far, for few people believe nuclear deterrence will last forever and thus we must search for plausible, less risky alternatives to the present reality (see Allison et al., . But the double moral for psychologists seeking to contribute to reducing the risk of nuclear war would seem to be this: The level of deep causes is probably not the place to begin; and nuclear depth psychology is inadequate for the task, in any case.
INTERMEDIATE PSYCHOLOGICAL CAUSES: CONSTRAINTS ON THE RATIONALITY OF FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING
Those who have chosen to attack the problem of nuclear risk at the intermediate psychological level begin with assumptions, methodologies and goals which are quite different from those of the depth psychologists. First, the international system of sovereignty and competition deplored by Eins-tein and his followers is simply posited as a given. Nation-states exist; superpower competition exists; nuclear weapons exist; therefore, nuclear risk exists and will probably continue to exist for as far into the future as anyone cares to look. The goal, therefore, is not a psychological revolution but psychological knowledge which might assist policy-makers in the management of the risk of nuclear war. Moreover, the methodologies of those attacking intermediate causes tend not toward the psychotherapeutic analogies of the nuclear depth psychologists, but toward basic research related in various ways to decision-making.
The basic problem addressed at the intermediate level is that foreign policy makers, like human beings generally, are not as rational as we would like them to be. The virtually paradigmatic approach is thus to determine in specific situations the nature and extent to which decision-makers depart, or are likely to depart, from perfectly rational, omniscient problem-solving and to suggest ways in which the enormous gap between the ideal and reality might be closed slightly.
No one working on problems of constrained rationality in policy and decision-making expects to have an effect that is more than marginal. To illustrate why this is so, consider the fantasy of constructing what I'll call a "foreign policy robot" which has been designed specifically to oversee nuclear policy, for that is where perfect rationality would be most appreciated by the most constituents. Because this robot is thus a Benthamite decisionmaker for the nuclear age, I will call him "Jeremy." Jeremy's software has been designed in consultation with several experts, of course. His deep structures follow Hans Morgenthau's (1973) first principle of foreign policy analysis: "to give meaning to the factual raw material of foreign policy, we must approach political reality with a kind of rational outline ... presuming always that ... [the statesman-Jeremy!] acts in a rational (i.e., powermaximizing) manner" (p. 119).
But of course, our rational robot cannot live and conduct policy by means of a mere outline. Thus, we borrow from decision-theorist and psychologist Baruch Fischoff (1983) a loosely structured algorithm for making rational decisions: Thus, on all decisions relevant to nuclear weapons, Jeremy will be programmed to make the rational, best possible choice. Design, procurement, construc-tion, deployment, strategy, negotiations both domestic and foreign -on all these subjects, the best rational choice will be made. But best, according to which goal? Obviously we need a rational objective toward which to move our rational policy. We decide-perhaps rationally, perhaps not-that Alexander L. George (1980) has provided the answer: a rational decision regarding foreign policy, including nuclear policy, is one in which one "chooses a policy or option that is most likely to achieve national interest at acceptable cost and risk" (p. 3). We now have constructed in our imaginations a robot whose rational outline has been disaggregated into a rational decision-making algorithm, and he has been given a rational goal -to be sure that each decision maximizes our national interest, with all possible costs and risks taken into account. With our foreign policy robot in charge, with resulting decisions and policies of impeccable rationality, we would have greatly increased our confidence that a nuclear war would not occur because of misperception, cognitive rigidity or other examples of human fallibility in decision-making.
It is important to realize, however, that nuclear war is still possible within a fully rational, robotized foreign policy regime of a nuclear superpower. Why? Because we have made Jeremy relatively omniscient with regard to present structural realities and calculational power, but he is not omnipotent. That is, he would be forced to conduct foreign policy and manage the superpower relationship under present conditions: the United States and Soviet Union are both sovereign, competitive, sometimes hostile superpowers, and the threat to use nuclear weapons is an ever-present, if usually covert, instrument of foreign policy. Risk of nuclear war can never be zero in such a world. For example, Jeremy's implied threats to use nuclear weapons, made with the rational intention of bolstering deterrence and of achieving some foreign policy objectives, may be perceived by the adversary as an intention to go to nuclear war, thus creating a felt need to go first -either by controlled escalation or by massive preemption.
To the students of the psychological aspects of foreign policy who focus on intermediate causes, Einstein's post-revolutionary utopia and Jeremy the robot's perfect rationality share an essential trait: neither bears the slightest resemblance to the real world in which foreign policy decisions must be made. Murphy's Law, not Einstein's or Bentham's, prevails. Rationality, to use the term popularized by Herbert Simon, is "bounded," severely constrained by both internal and external factors. First, evolution has simply not constructed us in a way that is even remotely congruent with the requirements of the algorithm for rational decision-making we assigned to our robot. We just do not have the equipment that permits access to a "complete set of relevant consequences" or all possible options. Charles Lindblom (Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1963) , a seminal figure in the application of the concept of bound-ed rationality to political decision making, has captured marvelously the qualitative difference between problem solving by a fully rational algorithm and what I'll call "Murphy's algorithm": Dodging in and out of the unconscious, moving back and forth from concrete to abstract, trying chance here and system there, soaring, jumping, backtracking, crawling, sometimes freezing on point like a bird dog...[the decision-maker] exploits mental processes that are only slowly yielding to observation and systematic description. (p. 81) Is this fully rational? It is not. But Lindblom's point, which forms the psychological foundation for what he calls our policy "science of muddling through" (Lindblom, 1959) , is that while it may not be rational, it is natural.
It really is what we have to work with. Any strategy of improving the rationality of our decision-making must in his view begin with a realistic appraisal of our deficiencies -which are many. "Policy-makers," as psychologist Philip Tetlock (1983) has put it, "see the world 'through a glass darkly'-through the simplified images they have created of the international scene" (p. 68).
But bounds on the rationality of our decision-making are not only internal, part of our evolutionary equipment (or its lack). We are also constrained by imperfections in our ability to cooperate optimally within organizations and institutions, such as governments, which are above all else instruments of social decision-making. As Herbert Simon (1983) has recently and pointedly emphasized "we are not monads" (p. 75). Foreign policy in particular is not conducted, for example, by having citizens (who've never met) fill out a multiple choice test which they submit via secret ballot, to be counted and acted upon by someone like our foreign policy robot. Quite the opposite: foreign policy decisions are made by relatively small groups of various sorts, each with different goals and therefore interests, whose activity requires processes of consensus-building, conformity, and so on, which further erode any hope for fully rational foreign policy.
What does all this sum up to, with regard to intermediate psychological causes of a potential nuclear war? Just this: that by having defined a nuclear war as supremely irrational, even insane, and having structured our nuclear forces so as to guarantee that any rational decision-maker will see the suicidal foolishness of nuclear war -having done all this, we still have no basis whatever for concluding that nuclear war is anything like "impossible." In Einstein et al.'s. post-revolutionary world federation? In a world of nationstates ruled by robot-like, perfectly rational actors? No, probably not even in these fantasy-worlds would nuclear war be impossible. And in our actual world, according to all we know about the internal and external constraints on our rationality, we have no justification whatever for believing that nuclear war is impossible.
It is of course impossible to survey all the experimental, clinical and historical research relevant to the boundedness of our rationality. In fact, one cannot do this even with reference to a moderate-sized library, for one definition of scientific psychological inquiry is this: a search for the dimensions, extent, and limits of the bounds of our rational problem-solving ability. But for the general flavor of psychological research which by common consent has been deemed relevant to foreign policy decision-making, consult Table IV , which is adapted from J. P. Kahan et al.'s. (1983) remarkably useful Rand Note called "Preventing Nuclear Conflict." In it, one can find many famous and influential examples of documented proof that foreign policy makers are neither saints nor robots, but often close-minded, misperceiving, "group-thinking", conforming people, and some suggestions for improving their rationality, at the margins.
In keeping with our functional orientation, how might the multifaceted boundedness of our rationality lead to nuclear war? The possibilities, unfortunately, are limitless. Kahan et al. have assembled several of them into a lengthy scenario, "A New Cuban Crisis," in which misperception and bad judgment abound (1983, pp. 18-21) . It is plausible, though like all detailed scenarios for nuclear war, quite improbable. More concise and thoughtprovoking, in my view, is a trichotomy of generic "paths" to nuclear war they believe, correctly I think, are consistent with various sorts of psychological research:
1. Empirical studies in cognitive psychology suggest that decisionmakers may not always behave rationally, as deterrence theory presumes, and might actually escalate beyond a crisis to nuclear war for reasons that appear irrational or illogical.
2. Studies of behavior in experimental games suggest that, even if both sides are acting rationally, they may misperceive the situation and in essence make the right move, but for the wrong game.
3. Models of individual and small group dysfunction from psychiatry offer a possible fatal irony: Both sides may act rationally and both sides may correctly perceive the situation, but in the mistaken belief that the other side misperceives the situation, one side may take a protective action that results in a war that nobody wanted (1983, p. 18) . No wonder the authors conclude their survey by asserting that "the behavioral sciences provide a basis for distrusting the conclusion that a nuclear war between the superpowers is already adequately prevented" (1983, p. 18) .
What, then, is to be done to reduce the risk of nuclear war, a risk made (presumably) unacceptably high by constraints on the capacity of leaders to make the kind of rational decisions required by the logic of deterrence? In a general way, the answer is obvious: Do what is possible to reduce the immense gap in the potential for rational decision-making between our foreign policy robot and our actual foreign policy makers. But specifically, what sort of recommendations have been made by the most eminent students of the intermediate causes of a potential nuclear war? They are listed in Table IV: interventions suggested by political scientists, game-theorists, and psychologists.
But attention should be drawn not only to the content but also to the form of the various recommendations, a form which may ultimately render the extant intermediate psychology of avoiding nuclear war rather completely beside the policy-makers' point. In Table IV , no fewer than twelve suggestions are made which, if applied to decision-making bodies relevant to nuclear policy, would (one may presume) reduce the risk of nuclear war by reducing the effect of constraints on the rationality of decision-makers. The first ten begin, in turn, as follows:
As the compilers of the list suggest, the hortatory flavor of these recommendations disguises an almost total lack of impact from the behavioral sciences upon foreign policy decision-making. Behavioral scientists are studying decrements in rationality; they are also drawing conclusions and making lists of recommendations. But, so it appears, no one at the policy end is listening. In fact, the conclusions of the recent Rand survey of behavioral research on preventing nuclear war and also those of a recent Carnegie Corporation conference (1984) devoted to the same topic are identical: Behavioral scientists, whatever they may know, have made no headway at all in altering the process of foreign policy making.
Why is this? Why, if "decision makers should," do they not? There are many sorts of reasons, from the superficial to the deep and perhaps insurmountable. The report summarizing the results of the Carnegie Conference notes several traditional problems faced by behavioral science: it is thought to be mushy and unreliable, opinionated and ideological, jargon-ridden and incomprehensible, and too complex to be fully absorbed by busy policymakers (Carnegie Corporation, 1984, pp. 17-20) . These are important problems but they are essentially practical ones. As the report indicates, practical problems of this sort, rooted largely in simple (but powerful) perceived mutual strangeness, can perhaps be overcome by continuing efforts by psychologists to communicate in various ways with members of the policy- examine evidence contrary to their beliefs.
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Decisionmakers should be taught how to perform cognitive map a simple map is constructed, more sophisticated and complex ma improve the decisionmaking process. making community. If these were the only problems, simple hard work and patience would eventually bring a payoff in reduced risk of nuclear war. But there are much deeper, far less tractable difficulties in the path of behavioral scientists seeking to intervene at the intermediate level of the causation of a potential nuclear war. Chief among these is that which Kahan et al. call in their Rand Note (1983) the "self-reflexive nature of previous recommendations drawn from the behavioral sciences" (p. 40). The basic problem is this: "the decisionmaker who must improve decisionmaking is the very person whose decisionmaking is to be improved" (Kahan et al., 1983, p. 40) . This is far from mere clever doubletalk. It unpacks the problem behind the hortatory form ("decisionmakers should") of behavioral recommendations. As Kahan et al. point out, the policy maker's response may legitimately be something like: "Who says I should?" or "Why should I?" or "What is wrong with current practice?" All decision makers are doubtless convinced most of the time, as are behavioral scientists, that they are acting as rationally as circumstances will allow. The fundamental problem, therefore, is that in the view of policy makers, behavioral recommendations just do not appear to arise from a context which is relevant to foreign policy. And they do not. Reversing the direction of the exhortation makes this clearer: "Behavioral scientists should..." etc. To each side receiving such directives, the advice must seem presumptuous and irrelevant.
The great divide separating the behavioral science of decision-making from nuclear policy-making cannot plausibly be attributed to some inherent faultiness in the psychological research itself. Indeed, the literature on sources of error and bias in decision-making is a large and impressive one (see, e.g., Nisbet and Ross, 1980; Slovic et al., 1977; Kahneman, 1974, 1981) . Moreover, evidence of over-confidence, nonrecognition of trade-offs, and belief perseverance is far from limited to laboratory studies of college students and has, in fact, been shown to apply to groups as diverse as classroom teachers (Rosenthal and Jacobson, 1968) , basketball players (Tversky et al., 1985) and research psychologists (Rosenthal and Rosnow, 1969 ).
These studies demonstrate with quantitative precision that human problem-solving and decision-making is frought with biases, false presumptions, and inadequate procedures that render many of our conclusions very far from the objective facts we take them to be. Of course, the goal of this research is not simply to point out how biased or devious we all are, but rather to discover the invariants in the processes by which we reliably reach mistaken conclusions. Once some of these factors are known, it is presumed that their influence can be reduced and the objectivity and overall quality of our decision-making concomitantly improved.
The best-known attempt to apply the methods and findings of the behavioral science decision-making to foreign policy-making is that of Irv-ing Janis (1982) . He has written extensively about the ways he believes "groupthink"-the tendency of decision-makers in groups toward biased and uncritical opinion formation -can be (and has been) an important component of presidential decision-making. There is little doubt that such a phenomenon exists, as Janis has shown in his studies of the Bay of Pigs fiasco and of the numerous decisions which resulted in the massive American escalation of the Vietnam War (1982, pp. 14-47, 97-130). The difficulty, acknowledged by Janis, resides in the failure of Janis and his colleagues to have any impact on political decision-making. He writes from the long and frustrating experience of a psychologist who has tried repeatedly and unsuccessfully to help decision-makers avoid groupthink. Here is his summary of the reactions he has gotten:
If you suggest a critical analysis session, most of the criticisms will be directed at you for disrupting the group spirit. If you try the devil's advocate role, the other members will act as if you were disloyal. If you tell the others of your diagnosis and point out the symptoms of groupthink, they are likely to resent your psychologizing because they feel you are accusing them of being incompetent. We cannot be very encouraging about the likelihood of success. (Wheeler and Janis, 1980, p. 208) Thus we revisit, in a more personal and poignant way, the reflexivity problem: "the decisionmaker who must improve decisionmaking is the very person whose decisionmaking is to be improved" (Kahan et al., 1983, p. 40) . This is an important reason why foreign policy-making has remained almost completely impervious to the ministrations of behavioral scientists. The nearly unanimous (if implied) decision of decision-makers to ignore the advice of behavioral scientists is rooted-or may be rooted-in a factor far more important than mere professional hubris. Psychologist Philip Tetlock makes the point concisely:
There is an enormous conceptual leap from the "relevant" research literature...to...American-Soviet relations. The research literatures focus on probabilistic relations among variables. The laws being sought are statistical ones that apply on the average. Policy-makers need to know what are the intentions, perceptions and capabilities of a specific government at a specific time. (Tetlock, 1983, p. 74) This suggests that, whatever may be discovered or already known by behavioral scientists about decision-making, it is quite unlikely that this knowledge will ever significantly reduce the risk of nuclear war, simply because it cannot intrude into the policy making process. The fundamental reason for this is that policy making is not an applied science. Contrast this with clinical medicine, which rests on, and is to a greater extent than ever before an application of, biomedical research. This is not true of the relation between behavioral science and foreign policy making. The former is in many respects a science, though a fairly primitive one; the latter is an art. Each grew up separately from the other and only one side-the psychological -seems interested in a rapprochement.
What is the likelihood that behavioral psychology might, in principle, become something like a basic science underlying and intimately connected with the construction and execution of nuclear policy? The answer, I believe, is: Extremely low. The obstacle is not the mere (though presently substantial) problem of reflexivity. It is related to Tetlock's point about the uniqueness and individuality of the variables a foreign policy maker must confront, but it goes much deeper into the very nature of decision-making in situations where nuclear war may appear to be a live option. Everyone acknowledges that such decisions must be awesome to contemplate and momentous to execute. Yet behavioral psychologists have tended to conclude from these facts that the central danger in such situations is that stress will occur and that decision-making will thus become faulty, resulting in decisions to enact policies which are riskier than they need to be (see e.g., George, 1980, pp. 47-49; Janis, 1982, pp. 250-259; Lebow, 1987) .
But this approach fails to address a basic characteristic of such decisions, which is that they constitute attempts to confront and transcend profound moral dilemmas. In fact, they are exemplars of a condition the philosopher Thomas Nagel calls a "moral blind alley...a choice between morally abominable courses of action...[with] no way to escape" (1979, p. 74; see also Hoffmann, 1981, p. 81) . For the essence of a nuclear crisis, from the standpoint of an American president or Soviet chairman, would be the confrontation with a set of policy options, all of which are believed to require raising the risk of nuclear war, whether in the short run or the long run. No matter which way he turns, he faces increased risk of initiating a holocaust of unprecedented and (in his own mind) totally unjustifiable magnitude. In such situations, decision-makers are unlikely to believe they are at something resembling a choice point in a behavioral psychologist's "decision tree." Instead, the situation they are in is likely to look much more like a "moral blind alley," and it will look this way not because stress has distorted their cognition and perception, but because that is the way it really is.
But let us take a concrete instance to bring home this point and conclude this section. In the depths of the Cuban missile crisis, John F. Kennedy is reported to have said that he believed the probability of war between the superpowers -thus, probably nuclear war -was "between 1 out of 3 and even" (Sorensen, 1965, p. 705) . It has recently been suggested that Kennedy's fractions represent merely "hyperbole" (Betts, 1985, p. 66) and that if Kennedy "really" believed that, he would have ordered a preemptive strike since, given the balance of forces in those days and the great relative benefit to the Americans in going first, the only "rational" thing to do would have been to strike, to go to nuclear war. According to this view, therefore, Kennedy did not really believe the odds he quoted. Or, if he did, his "irrationality" saved the world a nuclear war (Schelling, 1984 ).
But there is another possible interpretation, one I prefer and one which is consistent with the moral implications of Tetlock's important point. It is this: Kennedy believed the odds were between 1 in 3 and even but he chose not to go to nuclear war because his intuition, his ethical values, his reflexive responses told him it was wrong to do so. Schematically, what he believed he was doing was this: raising the risk of nuclear war in the short run (via the "quarantine" of Cuba) in order to prevent greater risks in the future (due to even more dangerous crises, say, in Berlin). This is reflected in a remark he made on October 22, 1962, in the televised speech in which the quarantine was announced. "The greatest danger of all," the president said, "would be to do nothing" (Kennedy, 1962, p. 809) . After making his initial decision to quarantine Cuba, he took many steps to ensure that Khrushchev understood that he, Kennedy, wanted to avoid a war with the Soviet Union at least as powerfully as he wanted the Soviet missiles removed from Cuba.
Once the president and his advisers concluded that the missiles must be removed (probably a correct conclusion, given the hawkish predilections at that time of many powerful congressmen, military advisers, and most American citizens), Kennedy faced a classic, if inordinately momentous, moral dilemma. The tension was between his utilitarian calculations regarding what he believed would happen to his foreign policy, and to American security, if the missiles were allowed to remain, on the one hand, and on the other, his absolutist belief that it is fundamentally wrong consciously to take steps which raise the risk of nuclear holocaust (see Nagel, 1979, pp. 53-74) . What would happen if he did nothing was, in his view, unacceptably bad, but what he believed he could not avoid doing was also reprehensible to him.
Nagel has written powerfully about this moral tension in regard to the duties of soldiers who find themselves in situations seeming to call for the killing of noncombatants. "It is," he writes, "perfectly possible to feel the force of both types of reason very strongly; in that case the moral dilemma will in certain situations of crisis be acute, and it may appear that every possible course of action or inaction is unacceptable for one reason or another" (Nagel, 1979, pp. 54-55) .
There is no doubt that President Kennedy felt some such moral tension very keenly during the Cuban missile crisis. According to Robert Kennedy (1969) , the moral dimensions of nuclear decision-making during those 13 days in October, 1962, become preeminent in the president's mind. "The thought that disturbed him most," he said, "...was the specter of the death of the children of this country and all the world -the young people who had no role, who had no say, who knew nothing even of the confrontation, but whose lives would be snuffed out like everyone else's" (p. 84). No matter which available decision the president made, he believed he raised the risk of set-ting in motion a chain of events which would result in the wholesale slaughter of innocents. Fortunately, we can still only try to imagine how intensely, how morally disturbed an American president or Soviet chairman would become after the first nuclear weapon is fired during a superpower crisis.
Thus, to say that President Kennedy did not choose to preempt during the missile crisis because he was irrational is to miss the fundamental point: There is more to good foreign policy and decision-making than simply maximizing our severely bounded rationality. Every situation is unique. And when the stakes approach the ultimate, as when a nuclear war is being contemplated, it may well be that "rationality" in the strict sense, based as it must be on probabilistic assumptions, comes to play a reduced role, and that the capacity to transcend (essentially) moral dilemmas becomes paramount. Our fundamental worry in such situations ought therefore not to be that our leaders will become irrational, but rather that they may lose touch with deeply embedded moral inhibitions which may be required to hold in check certain decisions required by the results of expected value calculations (see Blight, 1986a) . Thus one wonders whether those psychologists who believe they know something about eliminating the intermediate causes of nuclear war can, the in the present circumstances, speak to policy makers and be heard.
PRECIPITATING PSYCHOLOGICAL CAUSES: CRISES AND THE DRIFT TOWARD INADVERTENT OR ACCIDENTAL NUCLEAR WAR
Practically everyone who has ever committed any thoughts to print on risk of nuclear war takes for granted that, whatever the initial risk, it rises precipitously in a crisis -when threats to vital interests seem grave, when plausible responses to the threats all appear to be risky and when time to decide is short and shirinking (Lebow, 1981, pp. 10-12) . Intuitively, we know this must be correct, for all these characteristics of an international crisis cannot help but further constrain, in a drastic and dangerous way, the bounded rationality of our decision makers.
Intuitively, we also know that a fundamental reason why crises are more unpredictable and dangerous than "normal" times is that decision makers, groups, and machines all must function under stress. In fact, attention to the effects of stress on decision making in a crisis has been the virtually paradigmatic psychologists' response to the subject of political crises. There is a large literature on the subject, from human and animal psychology, from biomedical research, and from a rich anecdotal store house filled with the stories of those who survived stressful crises of every imaginable sortpersonal to global (Coelho et al., 1974; Holsti and George, 1975; Janis, 1982, pp. 250-259 ). Yet I have chosen to define the proper "psychological" domain of a policy-relevant inquiry into precipitating causes of nuclear war without reference to stress and its influence on decision-making.
The reason is this: The literature on stress and crisis is a direct analog to the literature on decision making that constitutes the bulk of psychologists' efforts to reduce nuclear risks by intruding into the policy process at the intermediate level. But, as I have argued, they have not intruded much, and for good reasons. The same argument applies to whatever "off-the-shelf" policy suggestions one might derive from the literature on stress and crisis. My conclusion is thus that if we psychologists and psychiatrists wish realistically to understand, perhaps eventually to influence, the policy-making process regarding nuclear weapons -and especially in crises when risk is greatest -then we must turn away from our shelves and strike out in a new direction. A brief outline of one possible route in that new direction is sketched in the following section.
Like the orientation of the present section, it follows from these principles:
1. Policy Autonomy. Nuclear policy making and decision making is a craft unto itself, a kind of art form or skill. It is not, and is not regarded by its practitioners as, merely a poorly applied behavioral science.
2. Policy Primacy. The integrity of nuclear policy makers as such must be respected. If one hopes to have a salutary impact on their work, it must be they, not we psychologists, who define the relevant psychological questions.
3. Policy Integration. Only by truly welding policy requirements with psychological insights is a behavioral scientist or clinician likely to influence the policy process directly. The remainder of this section is thus an attempt to understand what I take to be the policy and decision makers' relevant "psychology" in what seems to all concerned to be a nuclear crisis: one in which it becomes obvious to all pertinent leaders that nuclear war, long held to be highly improbable, even barely possible, now has attached to its occurrence a rising set of estimated probabilities. Plainly, nuclear war is believed to be a finite, partially enumerable number of decisions away. What sort of "psychology," then, is most relevant to the experience of being in such a situation?
We begin by circling round again to the central dilemma, the one that implies we cannot rest just because we have robust mutual deterrence. That is, though our efforts to deter have rendered initiating a nuclear war "insanely" suicidal, and therefore improbable, it may happen anyway, especially in a crisis when the boundaries of our leaders' rationality may become severely constricted. This, then, is one form-a primitive one, to be sure-of the psychological issue involved in such a superpower crisis: We want to under stand the evolution of the belief that escalating a conventional war to the nuclear level, or preempting with nuclear weapons in a theretofore nonmilitary crisis is the best, most rational-appearing option in spite of the extraordinarily high risk that either act would usher in a calamity without meaningful precedent.
We noted in Table I that most foreign policy-makers regard these two paths as most likely to produce a major nuclear war: escalation and preemption, both (by definition) occuring in a deep crisis. These are two examples of the general problem of what has come to be lumped together, as a rule, and called inadvertent/accidental nuclear war, occurring in a crisis. Since this problem is often drastically misunderstood, we must remind ourselves of the central worry. It is not lunacy or mechanical failure or effects of stress, even though the probability of each of these occurring in a deep crisis must, generally speaking, be higher than it is under normal conditions. Rather, the central psychological fact is a belief that it is relatively advantageous to strike in some measure with nuclear weapons, and the conviction to follow up on the belief with a decision to launch, either by escalating or by preempting.
Thomas C. Schelling and Morton Halperin (1969) made the essential conceptual point many years ago about the danger of "nuclear accidents": "the problem ...," in their view, "is not solely one of preventing the 'accidents,' it is equally or more, one of forestalling the kinds of decisions that might lead to war as a result of accidents ... Accidental war is made possible by the belief that if war occurs, it is better to go first" (p. 48). Likewise, according to Schelling (1983) , with what we call "inadvertent" nuclear war: "What we should mean by inadvertent war is a series of steps that inadvertently get one side or the other into the position where it advertently launches a large number of nuclear weapons against the other side" (p. 123). The central issue, in short, is one of belief: How should we try to characterize the evolution of belief within a superpower crisis that permits a decision to go to major nuclear war?
What would be the dimensions or categories of this belief, generally speaking? Alexander L. George (1984) has recently provided a useful canonical form for such a belief, or set of beliefs. The belief that nuclear war, normally believed to be insane, was "worth it" would, according to George, consist of three parts:
1. a belief that the crisis has gotten out of control, that cooperation in crisis management has broken down and cannot be restored; 2. a belief that war has become virtually inevitable, that it is time-urgent to decide what to do; and that one's choice is restricted to accepting a first-strike or going first oneself; and 3. a belief that there is a premium on going first. (p. 230, italics added) I believe George is correct in asserting that once these conditions had been fulfilled in a leader or leadership controlling a significant nuclear arsenal, then the psychological prerequisite for nuclear war would be met, deterrence would fail and nuclear war would commence.
But, of course, once this stage has been reached, nuclear war really is inevitable, just because someone with the power to initiate it believes that it is, and also that he must strike. Naturally, therefore, we should direct our psychological attention not to the moment of initiation of nuclear war, but to the evolution of relevant beliefs -that is to say, estimated risks of nuclear war, at certain times and in response to certain events -during a nuclear crisis. Our goal ought to be this, in my view: to learn enough about these evolving belief patterns to the point where one might begin to speak in an informed way about ways to manage them. That is, a psychologically informed intervention in a superpower crisis ought to help prevent the onset in all relevant leaderships of George's three fatal beliefs.
What this amounts to is the psychological foundation for crisis management, at the nuclear level. Viewed psychologically, that is, successful crisis management is the art of preventing the onset of beliefs which collectively comprise the prerequisite to nuclear war, all the while one seeks to exploit the situation so as to maximize whatever foreign policy goals warranted entry into the crisis in the first place. George has stated conscisely the basic tension, what he calls "the basic paradox and dilemma of crisis management," that make this critical enterprise so excruciatingly difficult to practice successfully.
The paradox is that there need be no crisis if only one side is willing to forego its objectives and accept damage to the interests at stake. The dilemma, in turn, arises from a desire to do what may be necessary to protect one's most important interests but, at the same time, to avoid actions that may result in undesired costs and risks. Indeed, "crisis management" can be usefully defined as embracing the task of resolving this policy dilemma. (1984, p. 224) As George sees it, this dilemma is thus due fundamentally to "the often competing requirements of force and diplomacy," the useful and purposeful integration of which is in his view so difficult and delicate that "crisis management will remain an art -and a difficult art at that -rather than a science" (1984, p. 224) .
By adding some psychological texture to George's remarks, I think we can see why this is so. In entering into a crisis, and in the manner in which leaders proceed through it, their goal is, in an important sense, to manipulate the beliefs of the adversary and, in so doing, maintain control of their own beliefs. As George suggests, it takes at least two adversaries with competing interests to create a crisis; a nuclear crisis thus requires the involvement of both superpowers. The psychological stimulus for each side's entrance would be the belief that the other side's leadership may believe it can in some important way diminish its opposite's perceived vital interests. Thus a crisis is precipitated when each leadership decides it wants the other to believe that a "dove's error" (or failed deterrence) will not be permitted in this instance.
Once such a crisis has begun, however, one must seek in that dynamic, tension-packed, evolving situation to balance risks of a dove's error and a hawk's error (failed reassurance). In the midst of a nuclear crisis, in fact, the great fear must become a "spiral" of hawk's errors; that is, the progressive escalating of the estimated probability of the other leadership's willingness to risk nuclear war to achieve its objectives, and the resulting response of raising the probability of one's own willingness to go to nuclear war, and so on until one believes the other side believes (or is about to believe) war is inevitable and so decides to go first, perhaps to "signal" resolve or to limit damage.
In order that such beliefs, thus nuclear war, be avoided (without one side or the other simply surrendering its interests and getting out) there must be some considerable degree of coordination between the beliefs, and highly contradictory dovish and hawkish intentions, of one leadership and those of the other. Anyone who has played a game like Monopoly or poker realizes how extraordinarily difficult it is in those circumstances to be certain that one's actions are truly responses to the actual (not imagined) intentions and capabilities of the other players. But when huge and complex governments interact in a crisis that could lead to nuclear war, the stakes are immense and "communication" takes place mainly via military moves and diplomatic initiatives, and the situation is of course much more confusing.
Assuming that both superpowers would in such a crisis wish sincerely and powerfully to avoid a nuclear war, the great fear at the root of worry over inadvertent/accidental nuclear war in a crisis is psychological: fear of the operational results of misperception, which leads to misappraisal, faulty decisions, and inappropriate actions, all of which trigger (and are reinforced by) similar processes in an adversary. The psychological problem of crisis management is thus very simply put though not easily solved: how to obtain a more accurate appraisal of the beliefs and intentions of the adversary and how to communicate to the adversary more accurate, if still contradictory, descriptions of one's own beliefs and intentions. Operationally, George (1984) has provided seven principles which in his view, if adhered to, would help to bring about more accurate communication of beliefs in a crisis. Briefly described, they are as follows:
At first glance, such a list may look like the list of items collected from psychologists in the previous section suggesting what "decision-makers should.
* ." and should not do. But the two lists are only superficially similar. For the psychologists' list is thoroughly and intrusively, and therefore rather irrelevantly, prescriptive.
But this is very far from the purpose of George's list, which is "prescriptive" only in the trivial sense that he believes policy makers who succeed in fulfilling its requirements will succeed in resolving crises whereas those who do not will fail. The significant feature, however, is that it is descriptive in the sense that it provides a summary of what policy makers actually believe they are trying to do; it is a variegated description of the actual goals of actual policy makers in an actual (though hypothetical) nuclear crisis, who actually wish to avoid a nuclear war while also manipulating the crisis to their advantage, or at least avoiding the impression of having been bested by the other side.
Will crisis management, this art form, really work when the nuclear chips are down next time? George himself is very cautious and far from sanguine about predicting a positive outcome. There are after all, he notes, "severe limits on the possibility of transforming military force into a highly refined, discriminating instrument of diplomacy and coercive bargaining in crisis situations" (1984, p. 224) . Many others apparently agree, for there has been a flurry of activity lately directed at establishing institutional "guarantees" that a nuclear crisis will never spin out of control. A recent report to the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Ury and Smoke, 1984) , for example, recommends a "Nuclear Crisis Control System," consisting of such features as a "Rapid Deployment Peacekeeping Force," a presidential crisis control seminar and regular nuclear "risk reduction" talks between the superpowers. These and other measures have as their fundamental purpose better, more accurate communication of beliefs and intentions in a crisis. Crisis management in its many forms has become a thriving discipline unto itself (Ury, 1985) .
But will it work? Richard Ned Lebow, a leading student of international crises is very skeptical. His argument has considerable force. Paraphrasing his main point, Lebow wonders whether the whole enterprise of crisis management isn't simply an inadvertent, fear-driven backsliding into the much maligned "rational actor model" of international relations. That is, all the myriad procedures, devices, and schemes designed to enhance accurate communication in a crisis require for their relevance the participation of calm, rational leaders who understand fully that nothing is worth a major nuclear war so, if they can just keep reminding one another of their "rational" beliefs, everything will eventually work out alright.
Is this a plausible assumption? Lebow (1983) doubts it, citing Khrushchev's erratic behavior during the Cuban crisis as evidence. "Rationality," according to Lebow, "... simply cannot be reconciled with Khrushchev's policy ... Khrushchev had no plausible reasons for questioning Kennedy's commitment to keep offensive weapons out of Cuba" (p. 451). He goes beyond this, indeed, to argue for a kind of psychoanalytic "expose" of the whole enterprise of crisis management. It may, according to Lebow, be simply a "defense" made necessary by the fact that "the possibility that irrational decision-making could result in a nuclear war is frightening" (1981, p. 298) . Like Freud's patient called the "Rat Man," who endlessly repeated the Lord's Prayer in trying to master his fear of rats, Lebow suggests the frightening specter of hordes of crisis managers citing "reasons" for the resolution of the Cuban crisis, and earnestly and fearfully building devices whereby reasonable people can exchange views in some future crisis, when in fact no one knows why Khrushchev entered or exited from Cuba, and thus no one knows on the basis of that experience how to plan for next time.
It is unnecessary, I think, to follow Lebow all the way to his Freudian and apparently nihilistic conclusion in order to appreciate what I take to be his central point of psychological importance. It is roughly this: We know very little about the evolutionary patterns and objective content of the beliefs about risk of nuclear war held by leaders during a nuclear crisis. This is true not only of Khrushchev and the Russians but also of American leaders. What we have are documents -interviews, memoirs, and so on -which may be of great interest generally but which are of very limited usefulness to those who would seek to build something like a psychological knowledge-base for crisis management. For, as I have tried to argue, crisis management consists in the successful management of beliefs -one's own and that of the adversaryin situations of extraordinary complexity, contradiction and confusion. Fundamentally, a nuclear war in such circumstances would be traceable to a belief, one which had evolved over time and in response to a bewildering variety of variables, that nuclear war was "worth it." Thus, from the psychological perspective I am proposing, the goal of crisis management is the balanced management, through a deep superpower crisis, of beliefs about risk of nuclear war.
But what do we know about this domain? Do we possess a systematic description of the objective referents -events, activities, messages-which actually stimulated leaders to raise or lower their beliefs about risks of nuclear war? Do we know anything consequential about the pattern, or patterns, in which such beliefs actually evolve during crises? Do we have any systematic evidence bearing on, say, whether American leaders in the Cuban missile crisis based their evolving beliefs mainly on messages from Moscow, naval operations, intelligence reports, domestic political concerns, actions of mistrusted colleagues, or any of the hundreds or perhaps thousands of other possibilities? Do we have anything like a map of the content of the perceptual landscape of decision-makers in nuclear crises? Have we thought usefully about what sort of transparent psychological methodologies might best permit the operational field of concern of decision makers in crises to be assembled, ordered, and described? Do we have a handle on the raw experience of nuclear crises sufficient to allow potential "crisis managers" to understand its salient invariants and to construct their devices and techniques in accordance with this experience?
It seems to me the answer to all these questions is "no" and that until some significant progress is made in providing a psychological knowledgebase for crisis management, we cannot say with any confidence that Lebow is wrong. We cannot claim to have gathered systematically any data which bear on the dimension on which, according to all accounts, all the relevant psychological action will be next time nuclear war and nuclear peace are on the line: the formation, alteration, and evolution of beliefs about risk of nuclear war.
A SKETCH OF A PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH TO THE PSYCHOLOGY OF AVOIDING NUCLEAR WAR I believe, with many others, that avoiding nuclear war is the most important public policy problem of our time. As a psychologist, I do not believe my colleagues and I have contributed significantly to its solution, which must, in my view, consist of piecemeal attempts to understand the dimensions of the risk of nuclear war and then to suggest ways of reducing that risk. I do not believe that reducing the risk of nuclear war is primarily a psychologists' problem although, as a psychologist, I do tend to frame the issue so as to make certain psychological aspects of the problem appear to be basic. Failure on the part of psychologists and psychiatrists to enter more fully into the policy makers' construction of the central aspects of nuclear risk lay, it seems to me, behind our tendency, especially at the level of intermediate causes, toward solutions we pluck off our own shelves but which are not easily integrated into the policy makers' modus operandi. It has also led, I think, to utopian schemes put forward as solutions to the deep psychological causes, solutions which fail to take adequately into account either the historical record or political reality.
The great concern of nuclear policy makers is with a crisis between the superpowers. But nuclear crises are not well understood; in fact, the sort that everyone fears is without precedent, for it is imagined to precipitate a major nuclear war and unprecedented devastation. Because crises are poorly understood -psychologically, as evolving belief-states -crisis management, which may at some future point represent the last shred of hope for avoiding a nuclear war, seems to me to lack almost completely a relevantly useful, psychological knowledge-base.
I cannot provide such a base here, or anywhere else, on my own. It is a large task. In this concluding section, therefore, I want merely to try to suggest a certain direction, an attitude and the underlying assumptions of a kind of psychological approach that, it seems to me, allows the problem of avoiding nuclear war to remain within the policy makers' focus, but which nevertheless invites the psychologists' assistance. There may be other ways to meet these twin requirements; this is the one which seems to me most promising.
We should begin, I believe, by taking seriously Lebow's criticism of crisis management: It may be a kind of fantasy, a rationalistic shield against an irrational reality too fearful to confront head-on. Equally, of course, it may not be. But to the extent that our beliefs about the potential efficacy of crisis management are based on wishes, on our interpolating into our ignorance a model of rational actors acting their parts, then to that (unknown) extent we are not preparing adequately for the day when we may next have to manage a deep crisis between the superpowers. It is hard to determine where Lebow wishes to take us with his prescient argument; perhaps he means to say that crisis management may be impossible. If true, this conclusion would be very disturbing, for obvious reasons: One hardly knows where to proceed from the implied equation of crisis equals irrationality equals all bets are off.
Thus we need to find some middle ground, on which we can appreciate that crisis management may well be inadequately supported by psychological facts, but that this situation is amenable to meliorative solutions. Several conceptual points must be made initially. First, it makes no sense to replace a "rational actor" model with an "irrational actor" model. As the philosopher Jon Elster (1979) has observed: in order to gather the very evidence on which rationality could be denied in the case of a given individual, we must assume him to be rational if the outwardly observable behaviour is to be translatable into evidence. Irrational behavior only makes sense against a background of rationality. (p. 154) Relatedly, it is certainly not mandatory to assume that "rational actors" are perfectly rational. Jeremy, our foreign policy robot, may be perfectly rational, but imperfect, sometimes quite imperfect, rationality is the rule in human action of all sorts. What distinguishes human action, therefore, is not that it is perfectly "rational," for there probably is no such thing, but rather that it is intentional. Part -not all, certainly, but part -of the variabili-ty in human behavior is accounted for by our intentions, our motives, our conscious goals. Intentions, moreover, are shaped by beliefs which, though based necessarily on our imperfect interpretations of events, are nevertheless real motivators of human action. Some philosophers try to convey this point by saying that reasons are causes.
Thus we need not choose, as Lebow seems to suggest we should, between a view which holds that rational crisis management is possible, and one (perhaps his view) which holds that it is impossible. This is based on having made a falsely simplistic decision as to whether people are perfectly rational or not. They are not. But they are intentional, their intentions are based on their beliefs, and actions taken on this basis are to some extent caused psychologically, by the decision to act upon the concatenation of beliefs one holds at the moment. With regard to our subject matter, nuclear crises, a proper goal for the psychologist is, in my view, to try to get as close as possible to the particularity, diversity and (then) the patterning of the beliefs about risk of nuclear war, as they evolve over time in a superpower crisis.
As a hypothetical illustration of what I am driving at, let me return to the example of President Kennedy's putative belief that, in the depths of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the risk of war with the Soviet Union -and thus, probably nuclear war -was "between 1 out of 3 and even" (Sorensen, 1965, p. 705) . Now, if one is concerned, either overtly or covertly, to apply a rigid standard of profit-maximizing rationality then perhaps one would wish to conclude that Kennedy was either lying or "irrational." But if we simply assume that Kennedy believed it, but that as outsiders we are unsure what meaning these fractions had for him, then we need not call Kennedy a liar or irrational and we need not conclude that Western civilization was saved by "irrationality" (certainly cold comfort for aspiring crisis managers). In fact, we ought to try not to assume anything. Instead we ought to use whatever means are available to try to understand what the fractions, and thereby some fraction of the missile crisis, meant to one of its two most significant participants. Instead of concluding from Kennedy's cited fractions, we ought to try to move into the subjective world of beliefs and intentions in which, and by virtue of which, the fractions drew their meaning for the president.
What I have finally gotten round to, then, is issuing a call for a phemenological psychology with which to address potential precipitating causes of a major nuclear war (Blight, 1987) . We need, in other words, less effort at explaining crisis behavior -such as "the behavior was rational (or it wasn't)"-and more effort at describing the phenomenal world of the participants in decisions of nuclear war and nuclear peace.
I am reminded by all this of one of the central ironies of the history of my discipline, psychology. Most historians date the founding of scientific psychology (at least in America), with the publication of William James's Principles of Psychology in 1890. The very first sentence of that massive work is: "Psychology is the Science of Mental Life, both of its phenomena and of their conditions" (James, 1890, Vol. 1, p. 1) . With this sentence and the 1400 pages of unpacking which followed in those volumes, phenomenological psychology was, in effect, founded. Mental life, what it is and what it is about: these became the objects of attention for generations of psychology all over Europe.
But not in America. Between James's day and perhaps 1960 or so, U.S. psychology was dominated by complicated explanations of the behavior of hungry rats. James himself was rediscovered at about that time and a manifesto for his sort of psychology, a descriptive enterprise attuned to the particulars of intentional mental life, was issued in 1970 by Charles Taylor. What Taylor required of psychology as a whole, I would recommend for those with psychological inclinations who wish to reduce the risk of nuclear war. For "the white rat," read "rational (or irrational) actors in crises":
What is really needed is to throw open the doors, and examine the real world, take account not only of the more surprising performances of the white rat, but examine also what men [and women] can do. What is needed is a reflection on behavior in its own terms and a classification of its different varieties, a study of its structure, which will reveal the full range and limits of flexibility and intelligence. We need to see what has to be explained to get an idea of what it would mean to explain behavior. (Taylor, 1970, p. 78) At the core of Taylor's message then was that the available psychology told him little about the meaning of behavior to the person experiencing it. Mine is analogous: we know all too little about what it means to participate in a nuclear crisis. Until we know more about the meaning of that sort of experience, we will remain relevantly ignorant of the nature of the evolving belief-system, on which so much may depend in a crisis.
Something must be said about why the psychology of evolving phenomenal experience may be useful to policy makers. In a word, it is because it is transparent. Its goal is not to explain behavior, in the conventional sense, by imposing an explanatory scheme upon it. It is rather to understand, to whatever extent possible, the reasons actors give for their own actions (Polanyi, 1959) . Phenomenology (stripped of its Germanic jargon) thus has two essential features: (1) an emphasis on description of experience and (2) an emphasis on intentionality, or the extent to which behavior is a function of belief and purpose (Wohlheim, 1984; Taylor, 1984) .
By adopting some such transparent stance it ought thus to be possible to do two things: (1) to give a detailed account of the evolution of beliefs about risk of nuclear war in crises and (2) in so doing come to discover which aspects of events in the objective world mean to policy makers that risk of nuclear war has risen, diminished, or remained essentially unchanged. Since the goal of crisis management, viewed psychologically, is to manage beliefs about risk of nuclear war, we may thus be able eventually to transform it into a more empirically grounded endeavor. We may, that is, ultimately have some considerable idea of what we are talking about, psychologically speaking, when we speak of managing crises. We might discover which events, actions and policies are to be avoided -those which, when they occur in a crisis, mean to the participants that risk of nuclear war is fearfully high. For it is on the basis of such beliefs that any decision to go to nuclear war would depend.
I will conclude with a brief exercise, which I hope will illustrate by contrast what needs to be done. Its purpose is to stimulate your imaginations in the direction of appreciating the need for empirical phenomenological work to help avoid nuclear war in crises. The following psychological algorithm is adopted mainly from T. C. Schelling (1960) , but also from several others Laing, 1967, Chap. 4) . It represents a step-wise statement of the evolution of the psychological preconditions of a superpower crisis, culminating in nuclear war. After each point, or subpoint, I ask you simply to ask yourself: "Why, exactly, would I believe this? To what would I likely be attending? What precise fears and worries would drive me this far? What would it mean to me, at the onset of the belief, to hold that belief as a decision-maker in a nuclear crisis?"
Here is the canonical psychological sequence leading to inadvertent/accidental nuclear war:
1. Precrisis. I believe that both the adversary and I believe that major nuclear war is mutually suicidal, and is thus astronomically improbable. I trust his rationality. 2. The trade-off. I decide to raise the risk of nuclear war, in pursuit of some vital foreign policy objective. I still trust the adversary's rationality; that is, I believe he will respond in such a way as to keep the risk of nuclear war acceptably low. Hawk's Errors" leading to a belief that the situation is so perverse, deciding to go to nuclear war in some fashion appears to be the best option. 5. The Tipping Point. I believe the adversary believes that nuclear war is inevitable and so I go-I initiate a nuclear war.
I suggest from my psychologist's perspective that the task of crisis management at each stage is to manipulate belief about the risk of nuclear war, in oneself and in an adversary, by means of military operations and diplomatic initiatives. Especially critical is the task of manipulating beliefs about risk downward in moments of deepest crisis. Should we be confident in our ability to manage the next such crisis and avoid a nuclear war? I agree, with Lebow (and also George), that we should not, but not because decisionmakers are not rational actors and therefore won't follow our predicted scheme. What is missing in this canonical outline are empirical answers to the questions posed above, all of which sum to something like the collective meaning of experiencing such beliefs. We lack totally a systematic description of the evolution of their content, and we've therefore no idea what such critical beliefs might mean.
What concrete forms might some such research actually take, which has as its goal the discovery of the empirical content of the evolution in crises of beliefs about the risk of nuclear war? Such a phenomenology of nuclear crises must, it seems to me, assume at least these two forms: history and simulation. First, we need historical inquiries into nuclear crisis decisionmaking, especially in that closest call of all, the Cuban missile crisis. But we will require studies which are of a much finer psychological grain than we have had so far, and much less driven and fettered by a priori theorieswhether psychological theories like "groupthink" or strategic theories of deterrence. We need, in short, to direct such historical-psychological researches toward the goal of increased vicarious participation in these dangerous crises.
Second, as Morton Deutsch (1983, pp. 19-21) and Paul Bracken (1985, pp. 51-53) have emphasized, we need to create and apply a type of simulation which is much less pat, tidy, and irrelevant than has heretofore been used pedagogically both within and without the government. According to Bracken, an experienced designer and supervisor of simulations for the Pentagon, "...we need to develop realistic simulations that introduce members of the political high command to the problems of intense crises and even the breakdown of deterrence. Nothing of this sort exists today" (1985, p. 52) .
Until enormously more realistic simulations do exist, nuclear crisis exercises remain only "games" in the most irrelevant sense. In our histories and simulations, we therefore need more of what William James called Radical Empiricism. For the radical empiricist, according to James, "the crudity of experience remains an eternal element thereof... [including] real possibilities, real indeterminations, real beginnings, real ends, real evil, real crises, catastrophes and escapes" (James, 1977a, p. 135) .
Neither phenomenological history nor simulation ought to be considered preeminent. Neither can stand alone as the knowledge-base for a newly relevant discipline of nuclear crisis management. For while simulations can be made more operationally representative of present realities, they lack the psychological reality of actual crises, when nuclear war may really have become a live option.
Conversely, historical episodes, occurring under idiosyncratic contingencies, assumptions, and balances of forces, though rivetting and even unforgettable to their participants, must always lack the operational relevance which can, in theory, be built into simulations.
History and simulation must be regarded, then, as complementary exercises for psychologists searching for ways to transform crisis management from wish to reality and thus to begin to construct a psychological knowledgebase relevant to reducing the risk of nuclear war. I invite political psychologists of all persuasions to join in the exploration of the prospects for this essential enterprise.
